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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CITY OF MONTICELLO,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
LEE HATFIELD CHRISTENSEN,

Criminal No. 880343-CA

Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE TWELFTH (NOW SEVENTH)
CIRCUIT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
HONORABLE BRUCE K. HALLIDAY PRESIDING
Lee Christensen, Pro Se
Appellant
225 Hwy 30 East
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Mailing:
c/o Norman Christensen
965 South 15th East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105

L. Robert Anderson
Lyle R. Anderson
ANDERSON & ANDERSON, P.C.
Attorneys for City
of Monticello
P. O. Box 275
Monticello, Utah 84535

JURISDICTION
This Court has no jurisdiction of this appeal.
The validity or constitutionality of a statute was not
raised in either the justice court or the circuit court and
the decision of the circuit court is therefore final.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues are presented in this appeal:
1*

Does the Utah Court of Appeals have

jurisdiction over an appeal from a circuit court affirmance
of a justice court judgment, where the validity or
constitutionality of a statute was raised in neither lower
Court?
2.

Is it a crime for an individual without a

Utah driver's license to drive in Utah while his operating
privileges in the state have been suspended?
3.

Can Utah suspend the right of the holder of a

Wyoming license certificate, whose residence is unknown, to
operate a motor vehicle in the State of Utah?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
Interpretation of the following constitutional
provisions and statutes is determinative of this case:
Constitutional Provisions
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records
and judicial Proceedings of every other
State.
2

U. S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 1.
The Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
in the several States.
U. S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 2, cl. 1.
Statutes
A person whose operator's license has
been suspended or revoked, as provided in
this act, and who drives any motor
vehicle upon the highways of this state
while that license is suspended or
revoked, is guilty of a crime, and upon
conviction shall be punished as provided
for in Section 41-2-30.
Section 41-2-28, Utah Code (1985).
"License" means the privilege to operate a
motor vehicle over the highways of this state.
Section 41-2-l(n), Utah Code (1985).
The case shall be tried anew in the
circuit court and the decision of the
circuit court is final except where the
validity or constitutionality of a
statute or ordinance is raised in the
justice court.
Section 77-35-26(13)(a), Utah Code (1988).
Except
as
expressly
required
by
provisions of this compact, nothing
contained herein shall be construed to
affect the right of any party state to
apply any of its other laws relating to
licenses to drive to any person or
circumstance . . . .
Article VI, Driver's License Compact, Section 41-2-502, Utah
Code (1987).
The following is the procedure of the
issuing jurisdiction:
3

(1)
When issuing a citation for a
traffic violation, a peace officer shall
issue the citation to a motorist who
possesses a driver license issued by a
party jurisdiction and shall not . . .
require the motorist to post collateral
to secure appearance if the officer
receives
the
motorist's
personal
recognizance that he or she will comply
with the terms of the citation.
(3) Upon failure of a motorist to comply
with the terms of a traffic citation, the
appropriate official shall report the
failure to comply to the licensing
authority of the jurisdiction in which
the traffic citation was issued. . . .
(5)
The licensing authority of the
issuing jurisdiction may not suspend the
privilege of a motorist for whom a report
has been transmitted.
Nonresident Violator Compact, Section 41-2-603, Utah Code
(1987)
(b) Upon receipt of certification that
the driving privilege of a resident of
this state has been suspended or revoked
in any other state pursuant to a law
providing
for
its
suspension
or
revocation
for
failure
to deposit
security for the payment of judgments
arising out of a motor vehicle accident;
or for failure to deposit both security
and proof of financial responsibility,
under circumstances which would require
the division to suspend a nonresident's
operating privilege had the accident
occurred in this state, the division
shall suspend the license of the resident
and all of his registrations. Suspension
shall
continue
until
the
resident
furnishes evidence of his compliance with
the law of the other state relating to
the deposit of security and until the
resident
files proof
of
financial
responsibility if required by the law.
4

Section 31-9-204, Wyoming Statutes (1973).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the Judgment and Order of
Probation entered in the Twelfth (now Seventh) Circuit Court
of San Juan County, Utah, Honorable Bruce K. Halliday
presiding, on April 21, 1988, after a trial on March 31,
1988.

Defendant and appellant Lee Hatfield Christensen

(f,Christensenff) was convicted of violating an ordinance of
the City of Monticello (the "City") adopting Section 41-228, Utah Code (1985J1 on September 3, 1987, by driving a
motor vehicle within the City while his license was
suspended or revoked.

Christensen had appealed from a

conviction for the same offense before the Monticello
Justice of the Peace.
The City moved for summary disposition of this
appeal after defendant filed his docketing statement because
the validity or constitutionality of the statute was not
raised in the justice court.

That motion was deferred by

the court until after filing of the briefs.
This Court referred the question of Christensen1s

1

At the time of the violation, the City had adopted the Utah
Traffic Laws in effect in 1985. Though Christensen was
technically convicted of violating the City Ordinance, this brief
will refer to the statutes incorporated by the City's ordinance.
5

impecuniosity to the Circuit Court, which decided that
Christensen is not impecunious.

Christensen filed numerous

papers with this Court and the Circuit Court, including
notices of appeal from orders of a clearly interlocutory
nature, and a petition for writ of mandamus, which was
denied, but has not appealed from the final order of the
Circuit Court determining that he is not impecunious.
Christensen1s brief does not contain a certificate
of mailing stating that it was mailed or served on or before
December 17, 1988, and the envelope in which the City's
copies were received bears a postmark of December 20, 1988.
The City hereby moves for dismissal of the appeal pursuant
to Rule 26(2), R. Utah Ct. App. (1988) because of
Christensen1s failure to file his brief by December 17,
1988.
Statement of Facts
The City does not agree with Christensen's
Statement of Facts.

Christensen has not furnished a

transcript of the proceedings in the Circuit Court and his
assertions in his brief are not evidence.
The City does agree that the document attached as
Exhibit B to Christensen1s brief was introduced as evidence
at the trial.

That document shows that Christensen1s

privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Utah was suspended

6

for one year on February 5, 1987. The City also introduced
uncontested evidence that Christensen was driving within the
City on September 3, 1987.

Christensen, however, did not

testify, nor did he call any witnesses.

He was permitted to

introduce a copy of his Wyoming driving record, which showed
that he had been issued a Wyoming license certificate.
There is no evidence in the record that
Christensen is or was, on September 3, 1987, a resident of
Wyoming.

Christensen introduced no such evidence at trial.

The City does not believe that Christensen is or was a
resident of Wyoming.

In all proceedings in this Court and

below, he has listed an address in Wyoming of 225 Hwy 30
East, Evanston, Wyoming, but has asked that all mail be sent
to him in care of his father, Norman Christensen, at 965
South 15th East, in Salt Lake City, Utah.

Every notice,

paper, or pleading sent to his address in Wyoming was
returned marked "addressee unknown" and the owners of the
recreational vehicle court at that location finally told the
City that three years of records did not show that
Christensen had ever stayed there, that he was unknown to
them, and that the City should stop sending mail to that
address.
There is no evidence in the record that
Christensen challenged the validity or constitutionality of

7

a statute in the justice court.

His brief maintains that he

did, but there is no transcript showing that he raised the
issue in either lower court.

Counsel for the City recalls

no such challenge in either lower court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This is an appeal that should never have been
filed.

The validity or constitutionality of a statute was

not raised in either lower Court, thus depriving this Court
of jurisdiction.

Even in this court, Christensen's

constitutional arguments are raised only pro forma.

The

thrust of his argument is one of statutory interpretation.
Assuming that the merits of Christensen's arguments are
addressed, they should be rejected.

The State of Utah has

the right to suspend the license or privilege of any person
to drive within the State of Utah and properly did so in
this case.

Christensen1s Wyoming license certificate, if

valid at all, is not valid as against such a suspension.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION.

Section 77-35-26(13), Utah Code (1988) provides
that where an appeal is taken to the circuit court from a
judgment rendered in justice court:
[T]he decision of the circuit court is final
except where the validity or
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance
is raised in the justice court.
8

Christensen contends that he challenged the
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on a suspended license.

This reliance is misplaced.

Nebraska v. Reeder involved a driver whose license was
suspended by Nebraska for one year on April 12, 1968. On
May 6, 1969, after moving to Colorado and after his Nebraska
suspension had expired, he obtained a Colorado license. The
Court held that the Colorado license entitled him to drive
in Nebraska.

Even assuming that Christensen was a bona fide

resident of Wyoming, his period of suspension had not ended
when he drove again in Utah.
In New Hampshire v. French, the driver, a resident
of New York, was convicted of driving under the influence
and her right to operate a vehicle in New Hampshire was
revoked for 90 days.

The Court held that she could not be

convicted of driving while her license was revoked because
her New York license was not revoked, only her right to
operate in New Hampshire. The Court noted:
Other states have statutes . . . proscribing
only driving after suspension or revocation
of one's license, but . . . defin[e] license
to include f,any non resident operating
privilege." Our legislature may draft a
statute similar or identical to the ones
above in order to cover cases like the one
before us. The judiciary may not.
2

Indiana v. Churchill, 180 Ind. App. 349, 388 N.E.2d 586
(1979); New Hampshire v. French, 117 N.H. 785, 378 A.2d 1377
(1977); Nebraska v. Reeder, 188 Neb. 121, 195 N.W.2d 509 (1972)
3

New Hampshire v. French, 117 N.H. 785 at 788, 378 A.2d 1377
(1977).
10

The 'Jz.ir: . - j a i s L i r n r ?

h

^ s ^r-.^^^a

sir:n

Z('^ , Utah Code (1988) defines license as "tine privileae
cc. ccerate a motor

Tr

ohicic in ih±3

r-^^

- So^^\on

-•- - -

can :.nus be resiauca -J sav thar -*
operate a motor vehicle In this state has been suspended or
v-c. /- -<.ri.- r

3 nd

who :iri ves any motor vehicle 1 ipon the highways

• : '.r.io state is guilty of a crime.
Indiana v. Churchill draws a similar distinction
between license and privilege , a ::i :i s t i i ic t :i on \ ; 1 i :i ::! i the IJta h
Legislature abolished.
The rule of ] aw applicable to this case Is stated
:wi:iit:^: _^:
A pp

, Roy i 23 Coi n I. Si ij: f • i 1! i 6 i

2 ::
i
l 66 ( C :)nn.

1961}:
Donald Roy, Massachusetts operator, by virtue
of §14-39 is entitled to the rights and
privileges accorded to Donald J, Roy,
Connecticut operator, a person whose right to
: ]:: >erate a motor vehicle in Connecticut has
been suspended. Equivalent right does not
mean additional right, and the provisions of
§14-39 were not intended to be, and cannot
be, used as a back door means of obtaining
restoration of a suspended license.

^Connecticut v. Roy, 23 Conn. Supp. 26, 1 76 A.2d 66 at 68
(Conn. App. 1961)
J 1

III.

CHRISTENSENfS UTAH LICENSE WAS PROPERLY
SUSPENDED.

Christensen asserts that Utah has no power to
suspend his license and that only Wyoming may do so.
Assuming for purposes of argument that Christensen was and
is a Wyoming resident, a proposition that the City considers
very unlikely, Utah is nevertheless entitled to suspend
whatever license or privilege Christensen may have to
operate in Utah under his Wyoming license certificate.
The very Wyoming statutes cited by Christensen in
his brief and included in his addendum show that Wyoming
recognizes the rights of other states to suspend the
privileges of Wyoming residents and license holders to drive
in those other states.

Section 31-9-204, Wyoming Statutes

(1973) requires Wyoming to take measures to suspend the
license of a Wyoming resident whose privilege to drive in
another state is suspended for failure to deposit security,
precisely the situation in this case.
Christensen cites the Drivers1 License Compact,
Sections 41-2-501 et seq., Utah Code (1988) and the
Nonresident Violator Compact, Sections 41-2-601 et seq.,
Utah Code (1988) for the proposition that this Wyoming
license certificate authorizes him to drive in Utah until
and unless Wyoming revokes or suspends his license.
However, nothing in the Drivers' License Compact declares
12

that Utah may not suspend or revoke nonresident operator
privileges.

Furthermore, the Drivers' License Compact
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clauses of the U. S. Constitution prevent Utah from
suspending the licenses of nonresidents for failure to
comply with Utah traffic laws.

Both provisions prohibit

Utah from discriminating against residents of other states,
just because they reside elsewhere.

They do not prevent

Utah from enforcing non-discriminatory traffic laws against
all persons using its highways.
CONCLUSION
Christensenfs statutory interpretation arguments
are raised now for the third time.

His constitutional

arguments are raised for the first time.

He has relied on a

Wyoming license certificate without any evidence that he
resides or resided in Wyoming.

In fact, it seems quite

clear that his actual resident is in Utah.

He has subjected

this Court to a deluge of paper and the City to substantial
legal expense.

His conviction should be affirmed and double

costs, including attorney's fees, awarded under Rule 33.
DATED this /T/A day of January, 1989.

L .Robert Anderson
Lyle R. Anderson
ANDERSON & ANDERSON, P.C.
Attorneys for City
P. 0. Box 275
Monticello, Utah 84535
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